Evaluating the Performance of Incentive Contracts without Individual Transaction Data: Japan's Procurement of Defense Equipment

This material aims to provide readers who have learned contract theory with an opportunity in which they should explore their own evaluation of the performance of a system few data on which are available. Incentive contracts in procurement of defense equipment are taken as a typical example. The detail data on transactions of defense equipment are basically undisclosed for security reasons. Unlike other public goods, therefore, it is impossible to empirically evaluate incentive contracts for defense equipment. This material depicts the system of incentive contracts and the limited summary of transactions described in the official documents issued by the Japan Ministry of Defense. How can we evaluate the performance of those incentive schemes without individual transaction data?

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【書誌情報】

ページ数：12ページ

サイズ：A4

言語：日本語

商品番号：KBSP-03184

書誌コード：50153

対象年代：1999年から2013年

登録日：2025/2/5